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There is an unequivocal sign that a cooperation mechanism, a policymaking forum, a “G” in short, is losing 
effectiveness; that its agenda is becoming an end in itself rather than a premise for purposeful action. It is 
when its press communiquées lose focus and turn into long lists of unrelated wishes, none of which 
entailing a serious commitment by any of the participants. We have seen this in the past, for example in 
certain phases of the G7/G8 history, and malicious voices suggest this is already happening to the G20, the 
young and most ambitious global economic cooperation forum ever conceived. Are the critics right? Should 
we lose hope and start thinking about something else? The ongoing French presidency, that will convene 
the next summit in Cannes in November, is a tests. Meanwhile, based on our criterion, the ministerial 
meeting just concluded in Paris gives little ground to contradict the critics.  
As already noted in this Monitor, the first steps of the G20, after the launch of the new formation at the level 
of heads of state and government (Washington, 2008), had been promising. Pressed by events, in the Fall 
of 2008 the leaders swiftly put together a sensible list of priorities and an innovative delegation structure, 
composed of the G20 summit at the top, supported by ministers and governors, and by the Financial 
Stability Board and the International Monetary Fund conducting technical work in their areas of expertise. 
More importanly, concrete actions followed, especially in the area of financial regulation.  
Then two things happened. To begin with, the crisis ended; or, should we say, its most acute manifestations 
in the financial markets subsided. As we had expected, the ensuing sense of relaxation weakened the will of 
policymakers to minimize divergences and agree on concrete actions. Second, the priorities evolved. Faced 
by the difficulty of agreing on a set of macro-policies to reduce global imbalances, participants turned 
attention  elsewhere:  to  the  reform  of  the  international  monetary  system  (an  even  more  contentious 
subject, if possible), to the wish of some governments to combat “speculation”, notably in commodity 
markets, to the implications of rising inflation and the exit strategies, and so on.  
A good starting point is to recognise that all these issues are linked. All G20 members (even the US now) 
agree that global imbalances contributed to the crisis, and that something should be done about them now, 
before new and bigger gaps arise. The state of the international monetary system (IMS) is an angle of the 
same problem. For surplus and deficit countries alike, global imbalances are a symptom of the inability of 
the current non-system to define, and enforce, any meaningful notion of “rules of the game”. The US were 
allowed, even encouraged, to neglect their rising external deficit by their ability to issue ever increasing 
volumes of the only universally accepted reserve asset, the US dollar. On the surplus side, China and others 
were moved by similar (dis)incentives, with reverse sign; they were even forced, by lack of alternatives, to 
accumulate surpluses in order to secure precautionary buffers against future adverse shocks. The present  
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system lacks self-regulation, not only with regard to bilateral payment positions but, more importantly, 
with regard to global liquidity creation.  
Here  is  where  commodity  price  booms  link  up.  In  early  2008,  when  the  financial  crisis  could  still  be 
mistaken as mild and the recession had not yet started, commodity prices reached a historical peak, 
fuelled by five or more consecutive years of global liquidity expansion. After a short halt we are now seeing 
something similar happening again. Commodity markets are discounting the fact that the international 
community has found no better way, to exit the recession an prevent double dips, than to reactivate the 
same mechanisms of the past, made of new and bigger imbalances and an excessive expansion of global 
liquidity. “Speculation” (whatever it means) may add fuel in certain situations, but the new commodity 
bubble we are now observing (accompanied, not by chance, by stock market indices again well above 
historical trends) logically follows from the current global policy setting.  
The  French  authorities  were  right  to  include  the  reform  of  the  IMS  among  the  key  priorities  of  the 
presidency. The problem is that none of the realistic alternatives can by itself guarantee greater discipline, 
in a reasonably near future. A multipolar system, with a somewhat more prominent role for the renbinbi and 
perhaps the euro, would help balance the composition of international reserves but not necessarily ensure 
a firmer control over their total creation. The same applies to other proposals under discussion that feature 
an enhanced role for the SDR, either via regular allocations or some form of “substitution account”. It is 
unlikely that a better control of global imbalances can result soon from changes in the IMS. Besides, if 
effective cooperation is hard to achieve consensually, as we see, it is equally hard to seek it through 
systemic rules that themselves need consensus to be decided and enforced.  
A peer review process, based on a shared methodology and indicators to detect which country is out of 
balance  and  should  adjust,  supported  by  an  adequately  empowered  IMF,  still  seems  the  inescapable 
starting point. The Paris meeting just concluded opened up with a simple suggestion on the table: using 5 
indicators (current accounts, international reserves, exchange rates, public deficits and private savings) to 
preliminarily identify external imbalances, triggering a more detailed review. After 2 days of discussion it 
agreed on the following formula to define the relevant indicators: “(i) public debt and fiscal deficits; and 
private savings rate and private debt (ii) and the external imbalance composed of the trade balance and 
net investment income flows and transfers, taking due consideration of exchange rate, fiscal, monetary 
and other policies.” One may object to this use of ministerial time, or to the convoluted wording, but this 
matters little. What is important is to move ahead: complete the agreement with operational guidelines and 
put the review process to work. This is what the leaders promised in Pittsburgh. Perhaps the parties will end 
up agreeing on what to do, even if they disagreed on why to do it.  
Post scriptum. Two final remarks on other subjects:  
1.    Financial reform. This is another key topic of the G20 agenda, but was not a majoe focus of the 
discussion in Paris. Ministers and governors reiterated their mandate to the Financial Stability Board to 
bring forward its agenda, notably on all aspects of the Basel III framework and on shadow banking systems. 
All in all, the FSB agenda appears to be on track, though effective implementation in all jurisdictions will be a 
different matter.   
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2.    Speculation in commodity markets. After the comments heard on the eve of the meeting, it is surprising 
to  see  that  the  word  “speculation”  was  not  even  mentioned  the  ministers’  final  statement.  This  is 
unfortunate, not because the subject necessarily justifies policy intervention, but because it would be 
useful to give more substance to the notion of “potential excessive commodity price volatility”, mentioned 
in the statement. The IMF has already conducted analyses that could be revisited and updated in light of 
the recent experience, as a basis for a G20 position on this issue.  
 
 